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PRIVATIZATION OF WAR AND THE U. S. 
MILITARY OPERATIONS
The mercenary captains are either capable men or they are not; 
if they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire 
to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who are their 
master, or others contrary to your intentions; but if the captain 
is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual way. 
Nicollo Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter XII
Who are they? 
Guess, which forces constituted the second greatest contributor to coalition forces during 
the invasion in Iraq in 2003. The U. S. military was the first one, but the British, with 
around 9, 900 troops, were not the second. They were the third with private contractors 
being ahead of them. There were over 10, 000 private military contractors during Opera­
tion Iraqi Freedom. Currently nobody exactly knows how many private contractors work 
in Iraq. According to the correspondence between the then Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, and Ike Skelton, a Democrat Congressman, of May 2004, there might have 
been as many as 20, 000 private employees on contracts in Iraq. However, in June 2006 the 
U. S. Government Accountability Office presented its report to the Congress in which it 
referred to the calculations made by Private Security Company Association in Iraq, ac­
cording to which there were 48, 000 private contractors hired by 181 companies. 1
1 Rebuilding Iraq: Action Still Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers, Washington 
D. C.: U. S. Government Accountability Office, June 2006. 
2 See: P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003; K. Silverstein, Private Warriors, London: Verso, 2000; D. Avant, Private Security 
Companies, “New Political Economy, ” vol. 10, no. 1, March 2005, pp. 121-31. 
These actors are referred to as: private military contractors, private security contrac­
tors, guns for hire, soldiers of fortune, corporate warriors, paid war-makers, etc. In the past 
they were commonly called “mercenaries. ” Today this term would be perceived as offen­
sive because the Geneva Convention of 1949 bans mercenary. Thus, modern-day merce­
nary has been institutionalized and organized into corporations which do not call them­
selves and do not want to be called “mercenaries. ” Instead they call themselves and are 
referred to as Private Military Companies (PMCs) or Private Security Companies (PSCs). 2
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Private military firms operate in over 50 countries and are really transnational. The 
majority of them are U. S. -based, but the British and South-African are also the leading 
ones. PMCs are multinational business companies, usually run by retired military officers, 
many are listed on the stock exchange. In 2005 Armor Group, the British corporation, 
which entered London Stock Exchange, achieved profits of 124 million pounds and its 
estimated value was about 30 mln pounds. Many of theses companies have been the fast­
est-growing firms since the 1990s and since the war on terrorism was declared, the stock 
prices of PCMs have risen significantly. When we look globally, in 2004 profits of the 
whole private war sector were approximately 900 million dollars. In 2005 they reached 
2, 5 billion dollars. 3 4
3 L. Matther, Profile Killer, “The Spectator, ” November 4, 2006. 
4 A Shiny Shilling, “Economist, ” vol. 377, issue 8449, October 22, 2005. 
A young member of British SAS earns about 3, 500 dollars per month. In “circula­
tion, ” as soldiers refer to the private market, he can get as much as 26, 000 dollars. '1 Corpo­
rate warriors are paid between 500 and 1, 500 dollars a day which means that even though 
they are less exposed to risk than soldiers, they earn much more. 
PMCs have participated not only in every single UN operation since 1990 but also 
every single U. S. military operation since the end of the Cold War was backed up by 
private firms. The number of private contractors as well as the scope of their tasks have 
risen gradually. 
What do private military contractors do? 
PMCs actually do almost everything related to security as the war in Iraq illustrates. They 
offer their services to governments of strong and weak states, to private business compa­
nies and corporations, and to non-governmental organizations. So “what do they do? ” 
They do not simply run soup kitchens for the military. They do feed U. S. troops but also do 
many other jobs. Here are some examples of their activities. 
1) they operate sophisticated high-tech weapon systems: 
- for example, they operate and maintain unmanned aerial vehicles like Predator and 
Global Hawk, as well as stealth B-2 bombers, F-117 fighters or U-2 reconnaissance 
planes, 
- they fly military helicopters, 
- in Colombia American private security companies fly planes destroying coca plan­
tations; 
2) they do intelligence gathering; 
3) they train foreign forces: 
- when the Pentagon officials talk about training the new Afghan or Iraqi National 
Army, they do not mean doing this with their own soldiers: U. S. PMCs, mainly 
Dyncorp (one of Pentagon’s favorite), won attractive contracts, 
- Science Applications International Corp, trains Iraqi journalists, police and sol­
diers, 
- Vinnell Corp, has been training Saudi Arabian soldiers; 
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4) they provide logistics, infrastructure and supply: 
- during the Gulf War in 1991 they provided maintenance to tanks and military ve­
hicles, 
- private contractors built and serviced Camp Bonsteel in Kosovo, the biggest Ameri­
can military base set up since the Vietnam War; 
5) they guard diplomats and private businessmen and companies infrastructure: 
- British Global Risk International guarded the Baghdad headquarters of Paul Bremer, 
the U. S. ambassador in Iraq, 
- in Kabul, U. S. contractors bodyguarded the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai - 
a natural target of Taliban assassination attempts, 
- in Israel private contractors protect American diplomats, 
- British Petroleum hired Defence Systems Limited (DSL) to train local forces in 
protecting its oil pipe-lines in Colombia; DSL also works for such corporate clients 
seeking for their infrastructure protection as: De Beers, Shell, Mobile, Amoco, Chev­
ron, CARE or GOAL. 
To conclude, in Iraq private contractors do almost everything soldiers would do. They 
shoot. They get shot, sometimes they get killed. They work on contracts with the U. S. 
government, with the Iraqi government and with private business. What we observe in Iraq 
is a global trend of privatized military and security services which is changing the charac­
ter of military conflicts. 
The origins of the contemporary privatization of war
The whole process of the contemporary American privatization of war can be traced back 
to the 1970s when a group of Vietnam veterans realized that it was possible to make money 
by selling military expertise abroad. They set up a company and in 1975 signed their first 
contract - it was with Saudi Arabia to train its army how to guard its oil fields. 5 Although 
the contract was controversial and led to Senate hearings, similar firms started emerging. 
5 D. Avanl, The Implications of Marketized Security for IR Theory: The Democratic Peace, Late State 
Building, and the Nature and Frequency of Conflict, “Perspectives on Politics, ” vol. 4, no. 3, September 2006, 
p. 512. 
And when you look at 1991, you will see that during the Persian Gulf war, 1 of every 
100 people on the battlefield was an American civilian under contract. 12 years later, 
during the war in Iraq, 1 of every 10 people was a private contractor. In terms of traditional 
war fighting this was unique since 10% of U. S. war effort in Iraq was conducted by civil­
ians. What did generate this immense rise of privatization? 
First of all, the number of U. S. troops was cut off drastically, by almost 1/3, after the 
end of the Cold War. Soldiers that lost their jobs flow into the free market of services as 
“gunmen for hire. ” The reduction of American military involvement and engagement abroad 
did not, however, follow this cutback. Therefore, the Pentagon had to find the way to fill in 
the gap in the army’s size. It turned to private contractors. 
Second, privatization is a crucial element of a broader process of changes in tradi­
tional civil-military relations. The division between this two spheres is getting blurred. 
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What’s more, NGOs and private firms operating within weak or failed states have to 
provide for their own security because local governments are not empowered to do so. And 
again they turn to private protectors. 
Privatization of war in the West is one sign of a general process or, as some see it, the 
“privatization revolution, ” which extends over many spheres of life and involves activities 
traditionally exclusively conducted by public institutions. Education, pensions, health-care, 
military industry, etc. are all becoming privatized. Outsourcing is about implementing 
methods of new public management according to liberal policies. This private-public part­
nership also entered into the military realm. 
The whole process of privatization of war has been speeded up by globalization. PMCs 
operate globally. Private contractors are flexibly moving actors, able to shift locations 
quickly and easily in response to changing market requirements. 
PMCs as an instrument of foreign policy
Outsourcing in the field of security is a very good way of by-passing public scrutiny and 
opposition. Whenever it is necessary to send the military, but the Congress and the Ameri­
can public opinion is reluctant to authorize the action or pay for more soldiers, contractors 
are a perfect instrument of policy-making. The PMCs executives do not give details to 
Congress as Pentagon officials do. Their activities largely remain hidden or opaque. 
Is it a form of military diplomacy? If it is, it might be highly risky, especially for the 
U. S., since this would be challenging state-centric practice of diplomacy. Here are pros 
and cons of using private contractors by the U. S. government. 
Advantages
For states, military outsourcing is extremely comfortable. Contracting out in general, and 
for U. S. military operations in particular: 
1.  Saves money
In terms of costs, PMCs are cheaper than soldiers. Let me give you one example. Between 
April 1995 and January 1997 South-African PMC called Executive Outcomes undertook 
an operation in Sierra Leone. This private company managed to bring under control chaos 
caused by the civil war in this country. Its overall performance was a great success. 20 
months of Executive Outcomes successful mission in Sierra Leone cost only 35 million 
dollars compared to 260 million dollars for the unsuccessful 6-month UN mission that 
followed. 6
6 J. Schulhofer-Wohl, Should We Privatize the Peacekeeping?, “Washington Post, ” May 12, 2000; 
D. Shearer, Privatizing Protection, “World Today, ” August/September 2001. 
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2.  Avoids accountability (allows to escape political responsibility)
Public opinion is usually not informed on private contractors being killed in action. These 
casualties are not soldiers, but private employers. This means that state is not responsible 
for them. Their deaths are not counted in official reports - media would not show them. So, 
using PMCs as a toll in foreign policy making is advantageous because there is a low risk 
of public opinion turning against the government. 
Sending more soldiers to a conflict zone will be definitively more difficult and politi­
cally uncomfortable than hiring a private firm to do the job. Private contractors go where 
the Pentagon would prefer not to be seen. Using PMCs can escape Congressional limits on 
troop levels. For instance, during US involvement in Bosnia Congress set the number of 
troops at 20, 000. But using additional 2, 000 private contractors allowed to bypass this 
restriction. 7 What is more, there is actually very little Congressional supervision of con­
tractors hired by the executive. This favors the executive branch of government since it can 
bypass Congressional questioning and opposition. 
7 L. Wayne, America s For-Profit Secret Army, “New York Times, ” October 13, 2002. 
8 D. Avant, Contracting to Train Foreign Security Forces: Benefits, Risks and Implications for US Efforts 
in Iraq, Statement prepared for the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on 
contracting issues associated with the development of the Iraqi Security Forces, April 25, 2007, p. 3, House 
Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, http: //armedservices. house. gov/pdfs/ 
OI042507/Avant_Testimony042507. pdf(01. 07. 2007). 
9 D. Avant, The Privatization of Security: Lessons from Iraq, “Orbis, ” vol. 50, issue 2, Spring 2006, 
pp. 327-42. 
3.  Is highly effective
The use of private contractors in often a much more effective option than deploying orga­
nized armed forces. PMCs have to fulfill outsourced tasks effectively if they want to be 
paid and secure future contracts. It is getting more and more crowed at the security ser­
vices market. Competition demands high quality of services. PMCs are much more ca­
pable of sending highly specialized personnel than national armed forces. For example, 
working under African Crisis Response Initiative private company MPRI was able to 
send French-speaking instructors to train the military in the francophone African coun­
tries. It would be impossible to find those people among soldiers. 8 Another PMC, Titan, 
could recruit translators needed for investigations of Iraqi prisoners. 9 PMCs drive from 
specialized human data bases of former soldiers, policemen and special forces agents. All 
of these contributes to the effectiveness of private military option. 
Disadvantages - problems with PMCs 
as an instrument of foreign policy
Apart from apparent attractiveness of private military contractors they, however, also rise 
some grim questions that shadow the uncritical usage of PMCs as a policy instrument. Let 
me briefly encounter with four serious disadvantageous elements. 
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1.  Unclear status
Although they conduct many combat-related activities, they are not soldiers and cannot 
take orders nor be subjects to command and control. Their primary rationale is not serving 
a national interest but to make profits for their company and to eam money. They are not 
essentially politics-driven but economic-driven. They engage in military business - not in 
military duties. They will do not serve U. S., NATO, EU or UN purposes but instead do 
their job to make money. One of the greatest illusions of PMCs is that they can, and often 
do, represent, if not actually serve, national interests. They do not. They are economic 
actors driven by the potent desire to maximize profits. At this point two powerful interests 
clash - national and business. Imagine that a PMC engages in a conduct required by its 
clients but which is illegal. Or think of a PMC refusing to fulfill its contract obligations 
once this turns out to be non-profitable enough. These are how national and business inter­
ests clash. 
A recent example of this clash is a firm closing down the airport in Baghdad which it 
was supposed to guard because of disputes over pay. 10 Nicollo Machiavelli would have 
something to tell us about this. He condemned mercenaries. Machiavelli warned that you 
cannot trust mercenaries, you cannot count on them. Why? They will shift employers and 
loyalties depending on how much money they are offered. They are simply unreliable be­
cause what motivates them is self-interest not any grand idea of raison d’etat. 
10 C. Lehnardt, Regulating the Private Commercial Military Sector, Workshop Report, Institute for Inter­
national Law and Justice, New York: New York University School of Law, December 2005, p. 8. 
11 J. Krane, Private Firms Do U. S. Military's Work, “Associated Press, ” October 29, 2003. 
One could argue though, that this conflict of interests is not always inevitable. The 
U. S. foreign policy has very often served particular corporate interests of individual com­
panies. However, there is a fundamental difference between a fruit, steel, telephone com­
pany and a military corporation. What is at stake with the former is human well-being and 
welfare. What is at stake with the latter is almost always human life. 
2.  The question of transparency
In this context the picture is more complicated. There is a heavy overlapping of politics, 
economics, industry, security and private contractors which together a comprise political- 
-industrial-military complex. Private sector supports politicians and expects at least favor­
able treatment. Business is business. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, 
DynCorp, Bechtel and Halliburton - all of them profiting by being contracted in Iraq - 
donated political parties, mainly the Republicans, with over 2 million dollars between 
1999 and 2002. 11 This political patronage marks the emergence of a new industrial-civil­
ian-military complex. 
3.  The question of accountability and the lack of regulation
To whom are they accountable? Who bears the responsibility in cases of tragic events or 
private contractors’ misbehavior (including crimes)? Is it a country (the U. S. government), 
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a company or shareholders? Private contractors are not accountable for their actions to 
governments just like soldiers are. They do the public business but are not accountable 
to the public. 
For sure, the lack of regulation is a result not only of unwillingness but also of inability 
to control or even monitor PCMs. The process of privatization of war takes place in the 
context of globalizing international economy and global capitalism. These globalizing trends 
escape state control. 
4.  Misuse
The lack of control and monitoring that could prevent misuse by PMCs sometimes leads to 
unethical behavior and wrong-doing of their personnel. Sometimes private contractors com­
mit crimes or act in an ethically questionable manner. Let me give you 4 examples. 
In the 1990 in Bosnia DynCorp operated a sex-slave of young women (buying and 
selling girls as young as 12 years old) forced to prostitution. They simply enslaved people. 
Since these private contractors were not soldiers, they were not subjects to military disci­
pline. The only consequence for their offences was to dismiss and send them back home. 12
12 L. Wayne, op. cit.; P. W. Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc., “Policy Review, ” no. 119, June/July 2003. 
13 P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors..., pp. 127-30; E. B. Smith, The New Condottieri and U. S. Policy: 
The Privatization of Conflict and Ils Implications, “Parameters, ” Winter 2002-2003, p. 110. 
In 1994 in Croatia Military Professional Resources, Inc. trained local forces which 
afterwards performed one of the worst examples of “ethnic cleansing” during which 100, 000 
habitants were forced to leave their homes. Hundreds were killed. 13
In 2001 in Peru a private military contractor shot down a plane just because he 
misidentified it as smuggling drugs. 
Two private contractors participated in the interrogations in the Abu Ghraib prison in 
Iraq where prisoners were tortured. None of them was prosecuted. 
In sum, the use of PMCs rises concerns not only about state sovereignty and account­
ability but also about human rights. When one examines such cases of private security 
contractors’ unethical behavior, one comes to the conclusion that in some instances PMCs 
might be the worst “diplomats” of “their” countries. 
Conclusion
There can be no doubt whether private contractors contribute to U. S. foreign policy. As 
Karl von Clausewitz noted, war is a serious instrument of politics. Those, who wage wars 
and get directly involved in military operations, carry out foreign policy. This is also the 
case with PMCs. They are going to play a pivotal role in future conflicts thus becoming 
important actors in international relations. 
The process of the “privatization of war” taking place in the West is mirrored in the 
Non-Western world, especially in weak, failed and falling states. Warlords, private armies, 
drug cartels, and finally, the most symbolic but not the most lethal of them - terrorists, all 
exemplify this tendency. They use privatized violence. This process, on the other hand, 
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could be called the “privatization of violence. ” I guess that in the future Western PMCs 
will be even more used by governments to face risks and threats posed by these actors. 
Privatized war will increasingly face privatized violence. 
This year one Blackwater Group, one of the biggest U. S. PMCs, founded in 1997, 
offered the whole brigade of 6, 000 private warriors ready to be used immediately. Who 
will buy their military services? Let me stop at this question. 
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